Target date funds in corporate retirement plans grew from $5B in 2000 to $734B in 2018, partly because federal regulation sanctioned these as default investments in automatic enrollment plans. We show that adopters delegated pension investment decisions to fund managers selected by plan sponsors. Including these funds in retirement saving menus raised equity shares, boosted bond exposures, curtailed cash/ company stock holdings, and reduced idiosyncratic risk. The adoption of low-cost target date funds may enhance retirement wealth by as much as 50 percent over a 30-year horizon.
two-thirds of new 401(k) plan entrants were automatically enrolled, with target funds the dominant choice for default investments (Vanguard, 2019) . This rising reliance on automatic enrollment and default portfolio choice in the U.S. conforms to a global move toward default portfolio choice in defined contribution systems (OECD, 2015) .
Compared to other multi-asset class portfolios such as traditional balanced and risk-based lifecycle funds, a target date family offers retirement savers two unique advice-related features. First, each fund is identified with an anticipated retirement year which serves as an implicit recommendation regarding which types of investors should hold each fund. If investors must make their own portfolio choices, the date labeling transforms a potentially complex decision about how to assemble a portfolio with the available funds on the menu into a simpler decision heuristic, namely to simply select the fund associated with the employee's anticipated retirement date. 4 Second, target date risk levels are automatically rebalanced over time by fund managers who follow an "equity glide path," reducing risk as participants near their target dates. 5 In what follows, we evaluate how the introduction of target date funds into 401(k) investment menus has reshaped participants' portfolio choice decisions, drawing on an anonymized, restricted-access longitudinal dataset from Vanguard, a major 401(k) plan administrator and investment manager. The target date funds we study are almost exclusively indexed portfolios, diversified across global equity and fixed asset classes, with management fees under 20 basis points. As a result, our dataset represents a real-world benchmark for the provision of low-cost, highly diversified professional portfolio advice to an important group of nonprofessional investors.
To assess the impact of target date fund introduction, we examine participant adoption and portfolio exposures one year after the first appearance of the funds in the 401(k) investment menus. We show that 28.4 percent of new entrants into voluntary enrollment plans adopted target date funds in their retirement saving accounts, whereas only 10.2 percent of existing employees (workers in the plan prior to the funds' appearance) switched out of existing investments into these funds. This difference we describe as an active choice effect, reflecting the fact that new entrants in voluntary enrollment plans had to make an active choice to join the 401(k) plan, whereas existing employees faced a discretionary choice of whether to switch to new options. By contrast, in plans with new-hire automatic enrollment, 78.7 percent of new entrants adopted target date funds, representing a substantial default effect. In addition, 21.7 percent of existing employees in these plans invested in the funds, double the rate of existing employees in voluntary choice plans. We take this latter result as a default-related endorsement effect: the employer's selection of target date funds as a default investment for new hires influenced existing employees' willingness to switch to the funds.
Similar effects are observed for other measures, such as the propensity to be a pure target date investor (investing all of one's savings in a single target date fund) or a mixed target date investor (combining a target date fund with other options).
In terms of portfolio effects, adoption of target date funds had sizeable effects on equity share and risk factor exposures: relative to non-target date investors, participants' equity share rose an average of 24 percentage points for pure investors, and by 13 percentage points for mixed investors. Pure and mixed target date investors' equity share also declined with age, whereas non-target date investors had a hump-shaped equity share by age. As a result of increased equity and bond market exposures, expected factor returns for pure investors rose by 2.3 percent per year and for mixed investors by 1.7 percent per year, relative to nontarget date investors. Holdings in cash and company stock fell, as did uncompensated idiosyncratic risk, in our sample of indexed target date funds. Accordingly, the introduction of target date funds produced an important shift away from participants' 401(k) plan portfolio selections and toward the target date managers selected by employers. This change will have sizeable benefits: for instance, we estimate that improved returns could raise expected retirement wealth by as much as 50 percent over a 30-year savings horizon, for a pure investor in a lowcost target date series. Inasmuch as employers may have introduced the funds responding to concerns over participants' poor portfolio construction patterns, we cannot assert that the results are completely attributable to the 'treatment effect' of target date fund introduction. Nevertheless, employees who moved into the target date funds could have previously made the portfolio changes on their own and realize the potential benefits, yet they did not. Our paper is informed by an extensive literature examining how default arrangements shape employee savings and investment decisions, though no prior study has explored the varieties of 'choice architecture' studied here. 6 There is also research asking whether peoples' portfolio choice is influenced by investment illiteracy or behavioral biases, 7 suggesting that retirement investment menus can shape, or "frame," portfolio allocation patterns due to inertia or naïveté, 8 or in reaction to excessive complexity (also known as "choice overload"). 9 Our contribution is to show how introducing target date funds into the 401(k) investment menu substantially altered portfolio outcomes across a diverse set of firms in voluntary choice and automatic enrollment as well as non-autoenrollment settings.
In what follows, we describe key elements of the plan choice architecture relevant to the target date setting. We then turn to an empirical analysis of adoption behavior and changes in portfolio composition, before versus after the introduction of the new fund family. We conclude with a discussion of implications of our findings for household finance and for the potential benefits that scalable, low-cost investment advice can provide. 6 On the savings side, see Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2009) ; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2004) ; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2003 ; Clark and Young (2018) ; and Madrian and Shea (2001) . On portfolio allocation, see Agnew, Balduzzi and Sunden (2003) ; Ameriks and Zeldes (2004); Benartzi (2001); Benartzi and Thaler (2001 Thaler ( , 2002 ; Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler (2007); Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009) ; Yamaguchi (2006a, 2006b); and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999; . 7 See Barber and Odean (2001); Bekaert, Hoyem, Hu, and Ravina (2017) ; Benartzi and Thaler (2001, 2002) ; Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2018) ; Goda, Levy, Manchester, Sojourner and Tasoff (2019) ; Lusardi and Mitchell (2007 ; Mottola and Utkus (2008) ; and Mitchell and Lusardi (2011); and van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011). 8 Examples include Agnew and Szykman (2005); Elton, Gruber and Blake (2007); Huberman and Jiang (2006); Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2007); McDonald, Richardson, and Rietz (2019) ; Thaler and Sunstein (2008) ; Tang, Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus (2010); and Pool, Sialm, and Stefanescu (2016) . 9 See for example Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang (2004) ; and Iyengar and Kamenica (2010) .
401(k) Choice Architecture and Participant Portfolio Choice
Our analysis draws on administrative records for 880 defined contribution plans that introduced target date funds between January 2003 and June 2015 (a period of 12.5 years or 150 months). These data were provided by Vanguard, a leading US 401(k) recordkeeper, on an anonymous, restricted-access basis. 10 Table 1 illustrates how the target date funds related to their target maturity dates, and it also indicates how each fund utilized a different mix of passively-managed U.S. equity (including large-, mid-and smallcapitalization stocks), international equity (both developed and emerging markets), and high-quality domestic bonds. 11 For instance, total equity exposure in the funds for young participants (column 7)
averaged 90 percent (in the 2040 through 2055 Funds), versus 30 percent for participants in the Income Fund (intended for retirees). 12 Table 1 here
To analyze target date fund portfolio choice, we selected a research sample of over 1.2 million active participants from the 880 plans that introduced target date funds January 2003-June 2015. 13 Both adoption and portfolio composition statistics were gathered for each plan 12 months following the first appearance of target date funds in the investment menu. Plan participants in the firm prior to the adoption of target date funds and still in the plan one year later were classified as existing participants; those entering the plan after the target date fund introduction date and still in the plan at the 12-month window were classified as new entrants. 10 All target date funds offered were Vanguard-managed. 11 In February 2013 the funds added an allocation of international bonds. We illustrate the allocations at the end of 2010 because they were typical of the period we study. 12 The Vanguard funds were all indexed except for holdings of inflation-indexed bonds available to only a small fraction of retired participant portfolios; accordingly, we refer to the funds as indexed. Fund fees were below 0.20% during the 2003-15 period (at the end of our analysis period, even lower-cost versions of the target date funds were introduced in a few large plans). During 2010, a small number of target date funds offered by other investment managers were introduced but these accounted for below 1% of participants studied. 13 Active 401(k) participants were those who are currently contributing to their employer's retirement plan. We only include plans for which we observe plan and participant records both prior to and subsequent to the introduction of the target date funds. Plans transferring to the Vanguard recordkeeping service for the first time during our sample period and adopting target date funds at that point are excluded from our sample because we cannot observe plan holdings prior to the funds' introduction. This distinction is important for understanding portfolio choice decisions. When target date funds first arrive in the 401(k) menu, existing participants must decide whether they will switch their portfolios to the new funds, away from funds previously selected. Factors influencing this decision could include the appeal of the key features of target date funds, namely their labeling as a form of investment advice and their automatic age-based rebalancing feature. Factors hindering adoption could include behavioral factors such as inertia and procrastination, as well as an endowment effect (whereby funds already owned may appear to be more valuable than those not yet owned). By contrast, new entrants would likely be more strongly influenced by a plan's choice architecture. In voluntary choice plans, new entrants making investment decisions would need a degree of financial literacy to navigate through the entire plan investment menu, compare target date funds relative to other options, and construct their portfolios on their own. Auto-enrolled new entrants, by contrast, would be directly invested into a single target date fund.
These latter individuals could either take no action and remain in the single target date fund assigned to them, or make a switch to some other portfolio with different features. indicating whether the target date series was designated as the plan's default option; and New-hire auto enrollment, indicating whether the plan automatically enrolled new hires, regardless of the type of default fund used by the plan. 15 The first column in Panel A reveals that 52 percent of participants were in plans where target date funds became the plan default. 16 One-third (32.9 percent) of participants were in plans where new hires were automatically enrolled in the firm's plan, regardless of the type of default fund used. 14 The average statistics pertain to plan-specific 12-month windows, rather than end-of-period characteristics.
Appendix Table 1 provides more detail on target date fund patterns by year. 15 Under new-hire automatic enrollment, newly eligible participants have contributions deducted automatically from their first eligible pay (with the right to opt out); their contributions are invested in the plan's designated default fund. Our automatic enrollment indicator is for new hires only. Some employers have "swept" (i.e., automatically enrolled) existing eligible non-participants, because our dataset does not include an indicator for such "sweeps." Accordingly our estimates should be viewed as lower bounds. 16 A plan may designate a fund as a default for several purposes, including automatic enrollment or as a fund for depositing administrative corrections.
Panel A also indicates that 24.7 percent of participants became target date investors with the advent of the new funds on the menu. 17 Two-thirds of these (15.7 percent) were pure target date investors contributing only a single target date fund, while the remaining one-third (9 percent) were mixed investors, holding a target date fund plus some other funds. The right side of Table 2 reports the percentage of pure, mixed, and non-target date investors having the plan features indicated. For instance, 72.1 percent of pure investors were in plans where the target date funds were the default, and 49.5 percent of pure investors were in plans where new hires were auto-enrolled. By contrast, fewer participants holding mixed portfolios (64.9 percent) and only 46.3 percent of non-target date fund investors were in plans where target date funds were the default. As also noted, plan menus averaged 25.6 funds in size, 48.4 percent of participants were offered employer stock as an investment option, and most employees (88.4 percent) had access to plan loans. Table 2 , we see that 19.7 percent of older participants were new entrants who joined their plans after target date fund introduction, within the 12-month observation period. 18 Other participant information included 401(k) account balances and contribution patterns, plan investments, and participant characteristics such as age, sex, household income, job tenure, and non-retirement financial wealth. 19 In terms of investor patterns, we see that pure target date investors were younger and more likely to be female, had low/moderate incomes, and held smaller account balances (Column 2, Table 2 ). Mixed target date fund investors had the opposite characteristics and above-average balances (Column 3). Because the panel spanned by our data included the 2008-9 financial crisis period, we also include an indicator for whether the 12-month plan window occurred during that period.
Adoption of Target Date Funds
17 Consistent with prior studies of participant investment behavior, we measure portfolio allocations using contribution designations rather than existing portfolio holdings, as the former better reflect forward-looking intentions. 18 Not all new entrants are new hires: while most plans do allow new hires to become immediately eligible to contribute, a few impose a 6-or 12-month waiting period. 19 Household income and non-retirement wealth were provided to Vanguard by Acxiom; amounts are imputed using zip code (zip+4) averages.
To assess the distinct impacts of default versus active choice on participants' portfolio selection, we estimate three multivariate models of target date fund adoption. Each model relates a distinct measure of target date adoption to default, participant, plan, and other factors, as in equation (1):
Here TDFAdoptioni,j,t indicates whether employee i adopted a target date fund in plan j in month t, measured using total contributions to the target date fund (from both the employee and employer (directing 1-99 percent of contributions to one or more target date funds); or 2 if the participant was a "pure" target date fund investor (directing all contributions to a single target date fund). In Model C, the mean time-weighted proportion of pure investors was 15.7 percent, and of mixed investors, 9.0 percent.
All three models use the dataset described in Table 2 , which included all active participants in our he 401(k) sample: a single observation is available for each participant 12 months following the first appearance of target date fund in his plan menu. Explanatory variables in equation (1) Table 3 summarizes the relative sizes of these outcomes. included in the menu as a voluntary enrollment option, unlike in our setting where we focus on the first appearance of target date funds in the menu. Our measured endorsement effects are meaningfully higher than in previous studies: for example, Benartzi (2001) reported that employees were over 1.5 times more likely to invest their own contributions in employer stock when the employer match to their account was in stock rather than cash (29 versus 18 percent). 23 In our results, the endorsement effect is associated with a two to nearly four times higher propensity to hold target date funds by existing employees, depending on the exact measure. Moreover, the endorsement effect we measure comes from a default designation affecting employees' co-workers rather than defaulted employees' own accounts.
We have demonstrated that plan choice architecture clearly has a potent impact on target date use, but other factors correlated with the outcomes are also worth mentioning (for details see Appendix Table   2 ). Target date adoption was highest among low-balance participants, and it fell for those with larger balances. Younger participants (under age 35) were also more likely to adopt target date funds, either as pure or mixed investors, even after controlling for the effects of new hire auto enrollment. This suggests that workers were either less financially sophisticated or more willing to adopt novel strategies or technologies earlier in their life cycles; hence they found target date funds attractive even aside from their default effects. We also note that target date portfolio choice decisions did not change significantly during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, indicating that the sharp decline in stock prices during the financial crisis did not alter participant demand.
Portfolio Effects from Adoption of Target Date Funds
Having examined how plan architecture influenced retirement savers' portfolios, we next assess how the arrival of target date funds to fund menus shaped adopters' portfolio risk and return characteristics.
To this end, we compare pure and mixed target date fund investors with their non-target date fund counterparts in terms of equity shares, portfolio return, risk, Sharpe ratios, and nonsystematic or idiosyncratic portfolio risk or variance (reported as a share of total variance, or NSR/TV). We further compare factor risk exposures of each participant subgroup.
As with adoption behavior, we measure several aspects of participants' portfolio allocations one
year after the first appearance of target date funds in the plan menu. Equity allocations refer to the fraction of participants' portfolios held in equities in that month. 24 We note that over our January 1998-June 2015 analysis period, the mean equity factor return (the return of the equity market less the risk-free rate) was 5.95 percent (standard deviation of 16.1 percent), while the mean term premium for bonds (the return of long-dated government bonds less the risk-free rate) was 5.41 percent (standard deviation of 10.5 percent). In other words, over the period, the risk premium from equities over long-dated government bonds was small, and long-dated government bonds had a superior Sharpe ratio to equities. Our results should be interpreted in light of how future return and risk characteristics might resemble, or deviate from, these historical data.
Figure 1 summarizes equity share by age for four categories of investors: pure, mixed, non-target date investors, and all participants. Most notable is the higher equity allocation at virtually all ages for pure and mixed target date investors versus non-target date investors. In addition, pure and mixed investors followed a distinctive age-based gradient or glide path, whereas equity shares among non-target date investors followed a hump-shape by age. Figure 1 here 
ω ω ω ω . portfolios yielded higher monthly systematic returns (60 to 70 basis points versus 36 basis points for nontarget date fund investors), slightly higher monthly volatility (2.8-3.1 versus 2.7 percent), lower monthly Sharpe ratios (13.1-15.5 versus 16.7), and substantially lower idiosyncratic or uncompensated risk (3.6-12.1 versus 25.3 percent). The most notable result in Panel C, besides the market risk increase already reported, are the sharply higher bond market and default premium terms, particularly for pure investors where these exposures doubled (e.g., 0.201 for pure investors versus 0.096 for non-target date investors, for the default premium).
We also seek to determine how these portfolio metrics vary when controlling for observable differences in plan choice architecture and participant characteristics. Accordingly, we estimate a multivariate model of the following form:
where PORTFOLIOi,j,t is a vector of the five outcome measures of interest-equity share, return, risk, (1), our models also control for plan-level heteroskedasticity ( i ν ), time fixed effects ( t τ ), and industry fixed effects, along with missing data dummies. All models also include a financial crisis control.
their intentional age glide path. By contrast, among non-target date investors, the equity share was only one point higher for young investors and 10 points lower for the older age group, a difference of only 11 points. the efficient frontier compared to non-target date investors, in that they were exposed to more equity, higher expected returns, and more risk. Yet non-target date investors -who principally owned diversified mutual fund portfolios and cash equivalents -were also on the efficient frontier but at a lower risk/return point, as noted in Table 4 . 28 Table 6 here One other finding from Table 6 is the large impact of target date funds on nonsystematic risk as a percentage of total variance. Idiosyncratic risk overall was around 21 percent of total variance across the entire sample. For pure investors, diversifiable risk was essentially eliminated, with an estimated marginal reduction of 27 percentage points; for mixed investors, it was substantially lower, by 13 percentage points.
These results reflect the index nature of the target date funds provided to participants.
Finally, Table 7 compares factor risk exposures across types of participants. Given that plan investment menus were dominated by diversified equity funds prior to the arrival of target date funds, mean market exposure was already 64 percent. Pure (mixed) target date adoption raised this further, by 14 (9) percentage points. The second most sizeable equity factor was value (HML), at 8 percent; both the pure and mixed target date options raised the value exposure of adopters materially, relative to that 8 percent.
Another clear difference is the increase in exposure to bonds among target date versus non-target date investors. For example, pure investors had nearly double the exposure to the default factor (10 percentage point increase on a mean of 12 percent) and the term premium (7 point increase on a mean of 8 percent); similar-sized effects apply to the term factor. Accordingly, target date funds extended participants out the yield curve and boosted their exposure to corporate debt, while materially reducing their cash holdings. 29 date labeling which acts as an implicit advice feature, or the convenience of the age-based rebalancing.
Nevertheless, we are convinced that target date funds are associated with sizeable shifts in retirement savers' portfolio risk factors and potential increases in future retirement wealth among adopters, relative to non-target date investors. Moreover, as Tang, Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus (2010) showed, adopters could have "rolled their own" portfolios to mimic the age-relevant target date fund mix using funds available prior to the inclusion of the target date funds on the menu-but chose not to until the introduction of target date funds.
Conclusions and Discussion
Retirement savers in U.S. 401(k) plans have traditionally been responsible for constructing their own retirement investment portfolios, but the advent of target date funds has altered the playing field for workers saving for retirement. We examine 880 retirement plans covering 1.2 million participants to highlight key behavioral mechanisms shaping target date adoption, and in turn, how target date fund adoption has substantively changed portfolio risks and returns among adopters.
We have identified three distinct behavioral effects influencing adoption when target date funds are introduced in either voluntary or automatic enrollment environments. One is an active choice effect in voluntary enrollment plans: here, 28.4 percent of new entrants adopted target date funds in their 401(k) portfolios, compared to only 10.2 percent of existing employees. The second is a substantial default effect in new hire automatic enrollment plans: 78.7 percent of new entrants in plans with new-hire automatic enrollment adopted target date funds, versus 28.4 percent in voluntary plans. The third is a default-related endorsement effect: that is, in new-hire automatic enrollment plans, 21.7 percent of existing employees not subject to auto-enrollment invested in the funds, double the rate of existing employees in voluntary choice plans.
We have also shown that retirement portfolios are dramatically altered when target date funds are adopted in 401(k) plans, as demonstrated by important changes in portfolio risk-taking. For example, pure investors adopting a single fund had a higher equity share (+24 percentage points), a sharper age equity share gradient (+26 points), and higher factor returns (+2.3% annualized), versus non-target date holders.
Besides boosting equity shares for pure and mixed investors, target date funds also produced a distinctive age-based gradient in risk-taking, compared to a hump-shaped equity allocation among non-target date investors. We show that target date participants took on the factor exposures embedded in the target date series offered by fund managers and selected by employers. In our data, that entailed more market risk exposure, greater exposures to term and default premia, and reduced idiosyncratic risk. 31
These changes are likely to be welfare-enhancing, under the joint assumptions that the target date design represents an efficient portfolio frontier (selected by sponsors and fund managers), and that workers without target date funds would fail to construct efficient portfolios or would select suboptimal points on that frontier due to financial illiteracy and behavioral biases. One illustration of the potential welfare benefits stemming from having higher equity exposure is that pure target date investors in a low-cost broadly diversified target date series could potentially realize up to 50 percent more retirement wealth, relative to non-target date investors. For mixed investors, the wealth increment could be up to 30 percent.
Given these estimates of potential benefits, one might ask what plan sponsors and policymakers might do if they wished to boost target date adoption among existing 401(k) participants. One approach might be to use 'reenrollment,' whereby the plan sponsors could transfer existing employees' investments into age-specific target date funds (or any other default fund), with advance notification to employees and the right to opt out. Reenrollment could lead to similar changes as outlined here for existing non-target date investors. 32 Our results also point to the potential effects of providing low-cost, scalable investment advice more broadly. That is, low-cost lifecycle investment algorithms such as target date funds or robo-advice services 33 could potentially help reduce portfolio construction deficiencies in other settings such as retail investment accounts or personal pensions, possibly reducing the heterogeneity of returns across households (Campbell, Ramadorai, and Ranish, 2019) . 31 A similar result is reported by Keim and Mitchell (2018) who analyzed target date fund introduction at a single firm. 32 For more discussion of reenrollment, see Utkus (2016, 2017b) 33 See Agnew and Mitchell (2019) . Table 3 for variable definitions.
Mean

TDF investors (%)
Pure TDF Investors 15.7 0.135 ** -0.084 ** 0.026 ** 0.012 ** 0.101 ** 0.072 ** -0.002 ** Mixed TDF Investors 9.0 0.090 ** -0.015 ** 0.013 ** 0.004 ** 0.050 ** 0.040 ** 0.001 * Choice architecture New-hire auto enrollment (%) 32.9 -0.018 -0.002 -0.011 * 0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 * New entrants 19.7 -0.015 0.014 ** 0.000 0.003 ** 0.001 -0.003 0.000 Participant characteristics Log balance (mean 2015$) 9.9 0.022 ** 0.003 ** 0.002 ** 0.000 0.002 ** 0.000 0.000 ** Job tenure (years) 10.0 -0.002 ** -0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 * -0.001 ** -0.001 ** 0.000 * Young (% <35) 25.1 0.032 ** 0.005 ** 0.011 ** 0.003 ** 0.011 ** -0.007 ** 0.001 ** Old (% >55) 15.2 -0.100 ** -0.009 ** -0.013 ** -0.001 ** -0.010 ** 0.012 ** -0.001 ** Male (%) 69.4 0.028 ** 0.006 ** 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.004 ** 0.001 ** HH income low (% <$62.5K) 31.0 -0.026 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** 0.000 -0.003 ** -0.001 * 0.000 ** HH income high (%>$87.5K) 42.3 0.015 ** 0.004 ** 0.002 ** 0.000 0.002 ** 0.001 0.000 ** Wealth low (%<$7.3K) 17.9 -0.028 ** -0.002 ** -0.001 0.000 -0.003 * -0.001 * 0.000 ** Wealth high (%>$61.2K) 49.9 0.024 ** 0.003 ** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 ** Financial crisis (% months) 8. 
